Abstract: Does the feeling of being alive entail a special feeling or rather a special object? More generally, is an object-less feeling conceivable? There is no doubt that there are feelings which seem less object-oriented than others. There is no doubt, either, that there are moments of experience that do not seem to be straightforwardly directed towards easily-locatable objects in the environment. Yet is there any convincing evidence of the existence of a special kind of feeling devoid of content? This paper questions such a hypothesis, yet without denying the existence of existential feelings; rather it is argued that there are no objectless feelings. The main argument is that it is unlikely that phenomenal character is the result of more than one condition, whatever it may be. While it is true that, in evolutionary terms, a redundancy of effects is not the worst strategy, a redundancy of causes is very unlikely -all the more for something so extraordinary as feelings.
The ontological requirements of existential feelings
There is some ambiguity in the available literature on existential feelings. Consider Matthew Ratcliffe on the issue as to whether existential feelings represent something. On the one hand he stresses repeatedly that existential feelings "are not experiences of specific entities or of entities in general. Instead, they are ways of finding ourselves in the world" (Ratcliffe 2008, 41) . On the other hand, he admits that "many bodily feelings are not experiences of bodily states but ways of experiencing the relationship between body and world" (Ratcliffe 2008, 11) . So, are bodily and existential feelings devoid of representational content or do they represent special content such as the relationship between body and world? It seems to me that resorting to ways of finding oneself in the world is vague insofar as it does not make it explicit whether such ways are phenomenal or not. If a way of being does not have a phenom-1 This work has been possible by the support offered by the Bilateral Project ICT-CNR -KAIST, Italy-South Korea.
enal character, it holds only an indirect relation with the issue of feeling. It could be argued that there is a difference between ways of experiencing something and experiencing something as something (i. e. representing it). I would assume that there is and that in both cases we are dealing with feelings with an object. For in both cases, there is a content (either the experience as such or the experience as representing something else). Here, the issue at stake is whether a "way of experiencing" could be totally devoid of content and yet still be a feeling. I don't want to deny either the usefulness or the phenomenological adequacy of Ratcliffe's analysis. Rather my aim is to focus on certain ontological worries that are going to arise if the notion of existential feeling is taken too far. So I don't dispute that the phenomenal space can be carved up in such a way as to make the necessary distinctions between perceptual experience, emotions, bodily feelings, existential feelings, and other important ways of experiencing the world. I don't deny either that existential feelings are an important aspect of our mental life and that they can be fruitfully distinguished from other kinds of phenomenal experience. For one thing, a distinction divides up a conceptual space in a certain way; it does not necessarily divide up reality in the same way.
What worries me is the notion of object-less feelings insofar as it suggests that being a feeling and representing something are two separate conditions. And I am worried because elsewhere I committed myself to an externalist view of mental states whereby a feeling is a process linking the subject with some real aspect of the world (Manzotti 2006b ). However, even setting aside such an unabashedly selfish consideration, an unrepresentational feeling is a notion that brings a lot of commitments with it, since it entails the existence of a phenomenal level which is autonomous as to any representational role. This is not a minor ontological commitment and it ought to be explicitly acknowledged.
Another issue that can't be underestimated is whether existential feelings are necessarily or contingently associated with other kinds of bodily feelings. Sometimes it seems that they are necessary to perceptual experience. For instance, Matthew Ratcliffe claims that "[e]xistential feelings are central to the structure of all human experience" (Ratcliffe 2008, 2) . This is vague. I can foresee at least four possible interpretations: 1) existential feelings are central to and indeed enriching of our phenomenological world but nonetheless they are not necessary to experience; 2) existential feelings play a central role in tuning and characterizing the structure of human experience; 3) existential feelings are necessary to the particular kind of experience humans have; 4) existential feelings are necessary to every conceivable kind of experience. Each of these interpretations entails very different ontological premises as to the nature and role of existential feelings.
Existential feelings seem to borrow their ontological status from intrinsic and internal states of the agent's body as if they were free of any semantic entanglement with the surrounding environment. Thus existential feelings partially overlap with equally worrisome notions such as bodily feelings. It has been claimed that "existential feelings comprise a distinctive phenomenological category in virtue of two characteristics: They are not directed at specific objects or situations but are background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured. They are feelings, in the sense that they are bodily states of which we have at least some awareness" (Ratcliffe 2008, 2) . Since these mental states are categorized by Ratcliffe as feelings, it follows that they cannot be just bodily states in the same way as a physical condition like low blood pressure or a particular metabolic condition. A feeling is something that is felt either because of some intrinsic phenomenal character or because of some representational role. As a matter of fact, Ratcliffe himself stresses that there must be "at last some awareness". The issue at stake here is whether a physical condition can be felt by way of its own intrinsic power (and then the question would be what such intrinsic power could be) or if all awareness is always an awareness of something. Indeed, it has been argued that the intrinsically qualitative is indistinguishable from the qualitatively experiential and thus that the intrinsic power may be identical to phenomenal quality. Of course, the most worrisome issue is whether physical processes have an intrinsic quality. If we could argue that they do, the identity between intrinsic quality and phenomenal quality might be persuasively defended (Coleman 2009) "All that we do know, on assumption of physicalism, is that the physical items whose intrinsic natures we have direct access to are intrinsically conscious." (Coleman 2009, 87) . Yet, what exactly are those "physical items"? In short: is a bodily state something that naturally possesses some awareness of itself ? Why should a bodily state be felt more readily than, say, the state of the chair next to me? Or the state of the computer keyboard on which I am now typing? Yet I do not believe that anyone could assume that a bodily state is closer to a mental state because it happens to be inside the skin boundary. As far as we know, a bodily state is as far from the mind as any other physical state in the subject's surroundings. It is true that a bodily state could be more easily accessible than the state of external objects. A bodily state could even be impossible to set aside. One could be wired innately in such a way that one could not avoid perceiving certain bodily feelings. It would be very convenient if we could just turn our attention away from a tooth pain as we do from an unpleasant visual scene. For many well-known evolutionary reasons, it could be all too easy to ignore undesirable bodily states at will. Yet all these undeniable factors do not count as evidence either that a bodily state is naturally felt or that a bodily state gives rise to a feeling with no content.
In the literature on existential feelings, it seems acceptable to suppose that the phenomenal character of mental states is the result of internally instantiated properties. For instance, most authors seem to agree that it is possible to have some awareness of a bodily state, although by means still unknown. On other occasions, an existential feeling is seen as the perception of a state of the self or of some kind of ongoing relation either between the self and the body or between the self and the environment. Somehow it is implicitly assumed that -because these mental states are internal to the self/world divide -it is easier to be aware of bodily states than of other matters. In short, it seems that if mental states refer to an external object, the issue of representational content can be dismissed. This is far from obvious. On the contrary, this issue is at the core of the internalism vs. externalism debate and has reached no stable consensus so far.
Worries about the phenomenal character of existential feelings
A feeling is felt. This is trivial. Yet such a statement constitutes neither an explanation nor a useful starting point. It is like saying that a pain is painful. Yet why should a mental state be felt? This is of course the most difficult question and there is no hope of answering it here. However, it is reasonable to assume that whatever the reason why some physical occurrence is felt, it is highly probable that such a condition is unique. This casts some doubt as to the possibility of totally different explanations for different kinds of phenomenal experience. In this respect, it is very doubtful to suppose one mechanism for existential feelings and a different one for perceptual experiences. We may be tempted to conclude that all phenomenal states which have no easily locatable representational content are indeed objectless feelings, but this would be an unwarranted conclusion. The above conclusion is questionable for various reasons. First, all phenomenal contents are distinguishable from others. How could they be distinguished independently of their content? And if they have a different content, don't they single out different moments of reality? Second, emotions, bodily feelings, and existential feelings, by and large, express a way for the subject to be, to be disposed to act, or to act. These are real states of affairs that are plausible candidates as the objects for the corresponding phenomenal states.
The understanding of the nature of existential feelings is hampered by the vagueness of many phenomenological descriptions as well as by the absence of a shared ontological and epistemological framework. In order to proceed further I will adopt a very simple standpoint. First of all the notions of feeling and phenomenal content have to be thoroughly examined. Are we really sure that all the phenomenal perspectives on mental life correspond to real differences in the structure of the underlying mental mechanisms and vehicles? An exhaustive analysis of the literature would go well beyond the limits of this paper. However, for the sake of the present discussion, it is perhaps sufficient to remember that, for now, there is no straightforward reduction of any of these notions to a suitable physical process. In other words, there is no evidence that such rich taxonomy of mental activities corresponds to an equally rich taxonomy of physical processes. It is more reasonable to adopt, at least for now, a more conservative and prudential approach -namely to consider one kind of mental process able to address different kinds of mental content.
Is this approach too simplistic? For one, Franz Brentano suggested that "every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way" (Brentano 1874, 88) . Some philosophers have rejected this all-encompassing view (for instance, Searle 1983 ). Yet many representationalists considered whether having feelings is indeed identical with representing something (Tye 1991; Stubenberg 1998) . Similarly Max Velmans argues against the existence of feelings with no object: "if one strips phenomenal content away from phenomenal consciousness, there is no phenomenal consciousness left!" (Velmans 2000, 152) . Although Brentano was open to the possibility that there could be different ways of addressing the same intentional object, his view suggests that the difference between different mental phenomena is fixed by different intentional objects rather than by different kinds of mental acts. If this were not the case, there would appear to be an unnecessary redundancy between kinds of acts and kinds of objects. Unfortunately, Brentano never succeeded in providing a satisfactory ontology either for intentionality or for the different kinds of intentional acts/ways of addressing the intentional object.
The redundancy between different kinds of acts and different kinds of objects is perhaps the main reason why a more parsimonious approach is taken into consideration here. The existence of special feelings with no content paves the way for a twofold source of mental content consisting of the object and the mental act. Although this could indeed be the case, it would be rather problematic since there is no guarantee that the two aspects of a mental phenomenon would share a compatible ontological ground. Besides, each aspect could be sufficient to fix mental content. In other words, if any mental phenomenon were a mixture of some quality stemming from the phenomenon in itself and some further quality stemming from the object the mental content refers to, wouldn't we be plagued by ontological overdetermination? How would they in -1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 termingle? Wouldn't it be simpler having different mental objects rather than different mental acts? Marcel Proust stressed that whenever you have two explanation of your behavior, it is likely that they're both wrong.
There is a further obstacle to the existence of feelings with no object. The existence of object-less feelings entails that phenomenal qualities are, in principle, independent of their object. In fact, the notion an object-less feeling runs afoul of all representationalist accounts of phenomenal content. Such a notion suggests that it is possible to have a phenomenal experience totally unrelated to anything else. This is a very strong metaphysical claim that ought to be explicitly outlined at the outset -so strong that I doubt it would be accepted.
Pure feelings
What about other well-known cases of alleged object-less feelings such as the feeling of existing, the feeling of being alive, the feeling of being sentient, some bodily feelings, and many emotional feelings? They all share the fact of being apparently without a straightforwardly locatable object. Why should these processes have a phenomenal content? Just because they are involved in the dynamics of a living organism?
Consider the feeling of being alive. It is a primordial feeling, but how can we be sure that it is shared by primordial beings? And why should life be correlated with feelings? As far as we know, the possibility cannot be ruled out that an artificial being may have feelings Chella/Manzotti 2009 ). Conversely it is conceivable that a living organism might be totally devoid of any feeling. Does a carrot have any feeling? Of course, it is alive. Why should metabolism, carbon-based chemistry, DNA replication, and multicellular organization lead to a certain feeling? Moreover, appealing to pure feelings as opposed to feelings of something is confused, both because it is not clear when a feeling is a feeling of something, and because it entails that there can be a pure feeling, thereby shifting the explanatory focus. This, in turn, is also vague because: A. If we are representationalist about mental content, we need to be so in a consistent way. Thus any mental content has to be such not in virtue of its intrinsic property but rather in virtue of its representational/intentional/semantic properties. So there cannot be a pure mental content 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 which is not a representation of something. However, one could be a non-representationalist. B. If we insist that a pure feeling does not require any content, we need to explain how we can distinguish between different pure feelings. Either they are all different kinds of feelings, but this will lead to a dubious proliferation of kinds of feelings, or they must have something that allows us to distinguish between them. Since it cannot be their kind, it must be something else: their content. C. The appeal to internal or bodily states is not convincing, since they are no more internal to the subject than the external world. The body is only a very rough metaphor for the subject whose physical boundaries are still to be defined in any definitive way. Furthermore, if different existential feelings are distinguishable thanks to the corresponding physical state of the body, they have a content which is precisely the bodily state (in terms of actual states, dispositions, or patterns of relation with the environment). D. One might be tempted to rule out the content of certain mental states because their object/content is not of the kind that we usually conceive. In other words, suppose that you are in the grip of an object-oriented ontology. You would conceive the world in terms of objects only, and then all mental states whose content is not of an object but rather of something else could be classified as mental states with no content. However, the problem is not that they are content-less, but rather the notion of content that has been adopted. For instance, we feel depressed when we are in a given bodily and dispositional condition. Why cannot such a condition be the content of a mental state? Why should we only accept objects and other easily locatable entities? Interestingly, the taxonomy suggested by Slaby and Stephan (Slaby/Stephan 2008, 510 ) suggests a range of existential feelings "between pure existential feelings at a basic level, feelings of basic familiarity and security on a second level, thirdly more specific existential background feelings, and finally on the fourth level emotional feelings in mood-like variations". This does not entail that existential feelings do not have any content; rather it suggests that they appear to be content-and context-oriented. Yet their object is not locatable in an external space, but refers to the attitude the subject developed towards reality. In fact, they explicitly state that "Thus, in a certain sense, these feelings manifest what we are at a certain time period" (Slaby/Stephan 2008, 511 These considerations ought to weaken our strong intuitions as to the existence of existential feelings as pure feelings devoid of representational or relational content. It could be more productive to extend our notion of content such that it can encompass all these known cases of phenomenal feelings.
Representational content vs. intrinsic content
By and large, there are two classes of explanations as to why a certain mental activity is felt -the relational/causal/intentional/representational explanation and the appeal to intrinsic properties. Let's briefly outline each of them.
The relational explanation is based on the idea that feeling x means being in some kind of relation with an x external -x and x external being either identical or different. Most of these theories attempt to explain phenomenal experience in terms of intentionality, assuming that intentionality is the basis of representation. Sometimes, instead of intentionality, causality gets the center stage, but the structure of the explanation is the same -namely, trying to move from either causality or intentionality to representations and then to reduce all phenomenal content to some kind of representation. Well-known and highly heterogeneous examples are offered by Hilary Putnam, Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and many others (Putnam 1973; 1975; Dretske 1977; Tye 1982; .
In contrast the "intrinsic" explanation suggests that feeling x is the result of the instantiation of some intrinsic property that, by its very occurrence, is felt as such., so there is no need to be in any relation whatsoever with anything. The feeling of x is an intrinsic property and it is only by virtue of x's properties that x is felt. Usually but not always, authors arguing for the existence of qualia defend this kind of explanation (Wright 2008) . The appeal to intrinsic properties is advocated also for representations in general, whether or not they are phenomenally experienced. Some argue that what distinguishes representations is either that they possess some innate semantic power (Fodor 1987) or that they mimic or copy the external reality (Kosslyn et al. 2006) . To return to phenomenal experience, recently neuroscientists like Giulio Tononi and Semir Zeki have proposed examples of alleged intrinsic properties. Tononi suggests that phenomenal experience is the result of a mathematical intrinsic quantity dubbed "integrated information" (Tononi 2004; cific neural circuitries for each mental micro-content (Zeki 2001; 2003) . Notwithstanding the differences, all these authors share the intuition that being a feeling involves the instantiation of a local property.
I would stress that it would be surprising and ontologically very wasteful if both classes of theories were true. For instance, I doubt strongly that we could be aware of a class of feelings because of some relational condition and, independently, be aware of another class of feelings because of some intrinsic property. Once again, it is worrisome that existential feelings (and to a certain extent bodily feelings and emotions too) are often explained as if they would not require a proper object.
The unbalanced equilibrium between existential and phenomenal feelings
Apart from the above considerations, there is one main obstacle to the notion of existential feelings per se. Please keep in mind that I am in no way denying the existence of them; I am only stressing the ontological obstacles posited by object-less existential feelings. Existential feelings may be feelings with a special object. The existence of object-less feelings might be riddled with ontological dangers. Suppose that an organism has indeed some kind of feelings whose content does not supervene on any further object/event/state of affairs. In other words, there are phenomenal states which express the organism's internal state without having that state as their object. Such a hypothesis seems plausible. Yet it entails that having a phenomenal content does not necessarily require any reference to further object/event/state of affairs This conclusion should not come as a surprise. And yet it is rather puzzling for a series of reasons. By and large, there are three possible options: a.1) both representational phenomenal content and non-representational phenomenal content are possible a.2) there is only non-representational phenomenal content a.3) there is only representational phenomenal content The first option a.1) seems the most feasible. However, as I mentioned in previous sections, it generates many further questions. How does a physical process with no representational role have a phenomenal content? If object-less and object-oriented phenomenal experiences are 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 based on different mechanisms, wouldn't there be a twofold hard problem (Chalmers 1996) ? It is already very hard to conceive one explanation as to how phenomenal qualities may stem from a class of entities. Having to outline an explanation for two separate cases seems really awkward. Furthermore, two sources of phenomenal quality might lead to further problems as to their mutual relation -how would it be possible for object-less and object-oriented phenomenal experiences to merge together?
Furthermore, we should stress another aspect that has only been partially mentioned. Having two sources of phenomenal content is basically an unstable solution. Suppose that there are indeed two sources of phenomenal content. Wouldn't one of them be enough? For instance, we could think that all phenomenal content is indeed internally generated and that, thanks to various mechanisms, it gets synchronized with external occurrences. In this way, there would be no need for a representational source of phenomenal content. All experiences would be internally generated in virtue of some internal power for phenomenal quality. This is a view that has its share of believers ranging from neuroscientists to qualia enthusiasts (Edelman 1989; Changeux 2004; Wright 2008) . And yet it is not yet based on empirical evidence or theoretical argumentation.
In other words, option a.1 is unstable. It tends to collapse into either a.2 or a.3 -if any of them is true. However, once we accept the existence of intrinsic phenomenal states, it is tempting to consider the phenomenal mind to be completely object-less, since it allows us to get rid of the problem of representations/semantics/intentionality. And yet neither a.1 nor a.2 offer any explanation as to why a certain physical process internal to the body of an organism ought to have a phenomenal aspect.
On the other hand a.3 suggests that having a phenomenal content is supervenient on being a representation of some further object/event/ state of affairs. Although it is not an easy road, at least two things speak in favor of it. First, there is overwhelming evidence that most of our phenomenal states have a representational role -all veridical everyday perception has a representational role. Second, there have been at least a few philosophical attempts to show how representations can generate phenomenal content (Holt 1914; Dretske 1995; Lycan 2001; Tonneau 2004; Manzotti 2008 
What do existential feelings express?
The other side of the notion of existential feelings, so to speak, entails a reference to the existence of some entity -plausibly that of the agent. Yet it is neither trivial nor self-evident whether the agent is something that exists. The agent may not exist at all. Many authors have defended such a view.
The agent may be either an illusion, or an explanatory debt, or an epistemic shortcut not dissimilar from a center of mass. In fact, there is no such a thing as a center of mass. The center of mass is only a shortcut to refer to the point in a system of bodies at which the mass of the system may be considered to be concentrated and at which external forces may be considered to be applied. Although it may seem that there is a center of mass and you may even feel attracted by the center of mass of, say, our galaxy, the truth is that the gravitational pull is exerted by the stars of the galaxy and not by the non-existent center of mass. If the agent were an epistemic notion of this sort, it would be unable to endorse any existential feeling.
However, it is conceivable that the agent exists in some stronger sense than a center of mass. Yet this would not automatically clarify the issue. For instance, the agent may be something that takes place repeatedly in numerically distinct instances like a trope. Would that qualify as a useful notion of existence or not? Would that exist? And what's more uncertain is whether the subject as an organism is something that exists or not (Inwagen 1990; Merrick 2001) . What is an object? What is a life? What is a living object? Do they exist independently of being singled out by anyone or are they just arbitrary collections of parts/processes/state of affairs which we single out for arbitrary epistemic purposes? The existence of a subject is one of the vaguest notions available; neither the notion of existence (individual, four-dimensional, dynamic) nor that of the subject is clear.
Similar considerations could be put forward as to the feeling of existing. Everything exists. Does everything that exists have a feeling of its own existence?This is unlikely, unless we embrace an unabashed panpsychist view (Skrbina 2005; 
Bodies and bodily states
A further option for existential aspects of feeling is the relation with the body of the agent. The relation between the subject as a whole and the body is far from being clear. Most of the philosophy of mind revolves around this issue. In the literature on existential feelings, it has been suggested that existential feelings correspond to a special class of phenomenal states apparently different from perceptual phenomenal states both in content and in structure. Ratcliffe holds that bodily feelings have a twofold structure and content: "They can be both feelings of bodily states and at the same time ways of experiencing things outside of the body." (Ratcliffe 2008, 1). In particular, existential feelings are both "feelings of the body" and "ways of finding oneself in a world" (Ratcliffe 2008, 2) . What is the body, though? And what is the subject that finds itself in a world?
Furthermore, it appears that existential feelings are somehow prior to perceptual feelings and indeed it is often suggested they are 1) "background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured" and 2) "feelings, in the sense that they are bodily states of which we have at least some awareness" (Ratcliffe 2008, 2) . This is controversial since it suggests a series of premises that, until now, had had no empirical justification.
First, the notion of bodily state is rather vague notwithstanding its widespread use in the scientific literature and in everyday discourse (Varela et al. 1991 (Varela et al. /1993 Clark/Chalmers 1998; Manzotti 2006b ). What counts as a body? What are its temporal, spatial, causal, and material boundaries? Where does my body begin and end? Are hair and nails part of my body? Is the body constituted by organs or by processes? What about a phantom limb? Is it possible to extend my body by means of prosthetic devices or more mundane devices as suggested by proponents of the extended mind?
Second, although the notion of body is far from clear, that of state is even more troublesome. What is a state of a physical system? Given a certain spatio-temporal subset, there are infinite states that could define what's going on. Consider a classical Newtonian physical setup: a sphere moving in space. Its mass, position, speed, and acceleration are probably part of its state. Yet is the color of the sphere part of its state? What about the internal composition of the sphere? How fine-grained does the state have to be? Is the center of mass sufficient? Do we need more details? There is not a final answer to these questions since the no -1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 tion of state is epistemic in nature -a state is not fixed by a physical system alone, instead it expresses the epistemic agenda of the beholder. If we are interested in describing the trajectory of the sphere, mass and positions with derivatives would be more than enough. If we are interested in more complex causal interactions, other physical features ought to be included. It is true that, as an extreme measure, it could be claimed that a state comprehends all the physical features down to the quantum level. But there would still be a tension between the description in terms of some epistemic domain and the physical system as such. To recap, the notion of state is not physical but epistemic. It is, to a certain extent, arbitrarily modifiable.
Third, the contrast between an inward and an outward orientation of mental states is logically a dualistic approach. Is my existence really confronted with an external physical world? Is there an inside and an outside? Once again it is indeed a committing premise that is not necessarily entailed by the existence of existential feelings per se. This premise is rather plain in many works that look at existential feelings or close phenomenal states such as bodily feelings and emotions (Damasio 1994; 1999; LeDoux 2002; Legrand 2006) . Although they are adverse to metaphysical dualism, they fall prey to what has been labeled either Cartesian materialism (Rockwell 2005) or cranialism (Honderich 2004) -namely some vague notion that the body and its states are some kind of inward domain separated from the environment.
Fourth, the proposal of looking at existential feelings as orientations, or modes, or structures of our perception is not satisfying. A structure of our perception has to be perceived in some way, thereby entailing a further meta-structure capable of apprehending. As far as we know a perceptual structure is invisible unless is contrasted with other perceptions having the same content but a different structure. For instance, a color blind person's chromatic space perceptual structure is undoubtedly different from that of a normal sighted subject. Yet the two subjects are neither aware of their perceptual structure nor are they oriented towards colors in a different manner. Unless one compares one's own perception with those of other subjects, the structure of perception is invisible. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 4. An externalist and representationalist perspective on existential feelings
To a certain extent, could an externalist view also be used to endorse existential feelings? By and large, externalism entails a target for each mental state. Externalism entails in some way that a monadic mental state is not conceivable. Indeed externalism entails some form of representationalism. Broadly speaking, externalism is the doctrine that either mental content or the mental vehicles or both are partially constituted by or dependent on what happens outside the head. This is a very broad definition that more or less encompasses most authors. As is to be expected, there are more and less demanding versions of externalism. Here I am not going to sketch an outline of the current theoretical landscape. For the sake of this paper, it is enough to remember that only very few authors have considered the possibility of phenomenal externalism.
In fact, most externalists have considered only semantic or cognitive externalism (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979; Clark/Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary 2010 ) explicitly leaving phenomenal externalism to "a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense" (Byrne/Tye 2006, 242) . Among these latter authors, the most celebrated attempts are those developed by Fred Dretske (1995; and William Lycan (2001) who, despite their many differences, share the hypothesis that phenomenal content depends on what takes place outside the head. Both Lycan and Dretske mostly consider content externalism insofar as their theories focus on the causal circumstances in which a certain internal representation is expected to hijack the proper phenomenal content out of some relation with external states of affairs. How is it possible for the phenomenal content to be taken from a relation with external states? It all seems rather vague to me. For instance, Dretske's phenomenal externalism defends a representational account of experience. The properties of a perceptual experience, insofar as it is mental, are determined entirely by the properties it represents things as having. Thus phenomenal content depends on what takes place outside of the head. Nevertheless, for Dretske, the vehicles of phenomenal experience remain inside the head.
Here I will look at a much more radical version of phenomenal externalism in which not only does the content depend on what happens outside the head, but also the vehicles of phenomenal experience extend 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 to encompass a spatiotemporal portion of the environment. Since the hypothesis suggests that the physical processes constituting the conscious mind are actually larger both spatially and temporally than those taking place inside the nervous system, I've called it "the spread mind" (Manzotti 2006a; 2006b; 2006c) .
A feeling is a mental occurrence. I won't use the word "mental states" since it is vague and misleading for various reasons I will outline below. From here on I will assume a Brentanian view of mental processes: any feeling is assumed to have an object/content. That is precisely why a feeling is distinguishable from others: because of the content that is felt when one has that feeling. The content singles out something specific thereby representing a certain past/present/future condition. How else would one know that one had a feeling x instead of a feeling y if not by feeling something different?
Externalism of the radical kind is a doctrine that suggests that any mental state has a content in virtue of being caused by or continuous with or overlapping with an external state of affairs. External to what, it might be asked? Well, the internalist/externalist debate usually involves the straightforward notion of being external to the subject's body. This definition would leave open the issue of whether mental states that refer to events physically inside the body are to be considered suitable for an externalist definition. To overcome this minor difficulty, we can view externalism as the hypothesis that a feeling gets its content from something external to the neural activity underpinning that feeling.
I defend a simplified and unified framework where all acts of awareness (object perception, feelings, emotions, existential feelings, moods) are instantiated by the same kind of physical process -differing only as to the role they play in the developing subject. It might seem that I have failed to draw a distinction between many rather respected phenomenological notions. It is a fair objection.
Once we take seriously the notion that existential feelings are feelings with an existential content, some sort of vehicle externalism may come to our rescue. In fact, if the boundaries of the subject are not confined to the limits of the body, the number of feelings with existential content can be extended. Let us consider a succinct outline of a neural monist process-oriented externalist view of reality that I have tried to describe at greater length elsewhere (Manzotti 2006a; . Although the above is a big mouthful, it is possible to flesh out its main features . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 First, a feeling is identified with a kind of physical process whose relevant feature is that it singles out and thereby references a certain content. Thus this solves the issue of representation by means of identity. To represent something is indeed to be identical to that something (Holt 1914) . The subjective experience, its meaning and the corresponding object would indeed be one and the same. Clearly this is a representational view of feelings since they derive their content from what they represent. However, this view is based neither on a semantic notion of representation nor on more traditional models. It suggests the rather surprising idea that to represent x is to be identical with x, whereas x is a process singling out both the feeling and its target at the same time.
Second, it is a neutral monist view insofar as it does not assume any sharp distinction between mental and physical aspects of reality. The world and our experience of it are prima facie aspects. They do not emerge out of each other; neither do they interact in troubled ways. Rather they are incomplete ways to refer to the same unfolding of elementary processes, each singling out a moment of reality.
Third, it is a process view since the elementary building block of reality is taken to be a physical process rather than an autonomous object or some individual in some more analytical sense.
Fourth, it is an externalist view since there is no separation between an inward mental domain and an outward external world. The subject spreads to comprehend the external reality. Yet setting aside the subject/ object dichotomy allows us to take the internal states of the subject to be just as external as the environment. This is interesting. It shows that the notion of the external world is just as dependent on our assumptions as that of an internal world.
All together, this view, outlined with outrageous brevity here, suggests that we can take a process view of the subject and its environment -the two being a unity unfolding by means of action, perception, and individual development. If this is the case, existential feelings could be those processes that single out the self as a whole. They would share the same causal and physical structure of perceptual feelings and yet they would refer to something else -namely to the subject as a whole. It could be argued that in such a framework, perceptual feelings could symmetrically be seen as existential feelings insofar as the subject is spread to comprehend the world itself.
To conclude, I suggest setting aside the assumption that existential feelings are a special kind of feelings and instead building on the insight 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 that existential feelings "pre-structure both affection and non-affective relations to the world, be they evaluative, cognitive or behavioral relations. They are the basis of the various stances and positions a person adopts towards events and circumstances in general and towards her own life in particular" (Slaby/Stephan 2008, 507) . This is a clear description of what could be the object of an existential feeling. Existential feelings would then be perceptual states of the various stances, positions, and relations a person adopts towards its environment. This would explain why it seems phenomenologically impossible to locate a proper object.
Being locatable is not an intrinsic property of an object. Rather it is a relational property. We are able to locate the content of an experience when such a content can be put in relation with a suitable network of other experience. Location is an extrinsic and relative position. Sometimes different frames of reference can conflict and produce an ambiguous result. If you get hurt in your thumb and then you put it in your mouth, could you claim that you have a pain inside your mouth? Hardly. The pain in your finger and the space in your mouth belong to two separate frames. There is no way to reconcile them. Where are our moods and emotions? Once more, they are not locatable, but this does not mean they are not objects/events/states of affairs. Rather they are not locatable since, in a strong sense, they are the subject as a whole, or a modification of the subject as a whole.
Analogously, where is an existential feeling? The fact that we cannot trace it back to any macrophysical object or spatio-temporal location does not mean that its content is not somewhere. Neither does it mean that there is no content. Rather it could suggest that there is no way to locate its content inside any relational framework. A possible explanation is that an existential feeling does not concern a particular object/event/state of affairs, but represents a global change in whatever the subject is. Thus the subject cannot locate it, since it is the subject itself which is perceived. 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 
